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Background
Security is a regional public good, as it is in the interest of the whole of society in 
its different spheres (local, national, regional and international). In the logistics 
field, a sensible application of measures duly coordinated with facilitation 
processes not only reduces the levels of risk and vulnerability for logistics chains, 
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but also helps to raise awareness of the problem of security, brings order to the operation 
of cargo terminals, promotes better operating conditions and increases the efficiency of the 
authorities’ controls. Taking account of all the above elements will have positive effects on 
the competitiveness and productivity of the economy (Pérez-Salas, 2013).
Both the public and private sectors have developed measures to strengthen the security 
of logistics chains, such as the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT ), the 
Container Security Initiative (CSI ), the Free and Secure Trade (FAST ) program and the Business 
Alliance for Secure Commerce (BASC ) initiative. Quality and security certifications should 
also be highlighted, such as ISO 28.000, which is a cross-cutting standard that promotes 
best practices in risk auditing and security event management in the supply chain, as well 
as the adoption of Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention and International Ship and Port 
Facility Security (ISPS) Code certifications in the area of maritime transport and ports.
ECLAC has also highlighted the need for a “National Logistics Policy” to govern the activity, 
coordinating and bringing together various international, regional, national and local 
initiatives, both public and private, to develop comprehensive and efficient solutions. Such 
a policy should be the result of the participation of private actors and consider at least 
three interrelated core issues —namely, Trade Facilitation, Logistics and Infrastructure— 
in order to encourage the opening of new markets for cargo, reduce the infrastructure 
gap, promote a systematic reduction in logistics costs, and encourage innovation and the 
incorporation of technology to generate value, in line with the paradigm of integrated 
policies developed and promoted by ECLAC (Jaimurzina, Pérez-Salas and Sánchez, 2015).
Recently, the attention of the authorities and of the private sector within the logistics sector 
has also been drawn to the changes brought about by the fourth industrial revolution, 
composed of technologies such as automation and robotics, blockchain, internet of things, 
big data and artificial intelligence, among others. The logistics system of the future, 
therefore, aims at the interconnectivity of information and the optimization of time and 
resources, along with strong investment and development in the area of innovation to 
maintain its competitiveness. With increasing technology, cyberattacks are also becoming 
more sophisticated, as cybercriminals use different tactics and technology to exploit 
vulnerabilities. As a result, the logistics sector will have to learn to deal with this issue 
and make it part of their risk matrix, just as it did with other threats in the past, such as 
drug trafficking and terrorism. Technological progress demands a new look at the business 
model that currently exists. The space-time paradigm is different from anything known 
a few years ago and will be much more so soon. The extent of the changes requires a 
profound cultural change in logistics governance, especially with regard to public-private 
cooperation, cybersecurity and the incorporation of resilience objectives in all logistics 
chain processes (Barleta, Pérez-Salas and Sánchez, 2019). 
2 F A L
Within the growing framework of digital and virtual representations of physical objects 
(or in some cases their replacement) that the digital transformation of logistical processes 
entails, an increase in the possibility of being affected by digital wrongdoing is to be 
expected. In the current context of digital transformation, accelerated in March 2020 by 
the COVID-19 pandemic, cybersecurity must be considered inseparably as an integral and 
updated part of physical and property security. The World Economic Forum’s Global Risks 
Report 2020 confirms this perception, with cybersecurity risks occupying second place 
behind natural disasters in terms of probability of occurrence and impact. See WEF, 2020.
This document seeks to raise the alert about the importance of cybersecurity in the area of 
logistics and to promote cybersecurity actions within it, together with a security paradigm 
shift, transitioning from cybersecurity to cyberimmunity.
I. Cybersecurity paradigm shifts
This section presents the main concepts that make up the technology sphere of security. 
In the sections that follow, those concepts will allow a more precise interpretation of 
the statistics on the current state of cybercrime threats worldwide, particularly in Latin 
America and the Caribbean.
Those concepts will also enable a better interpretation of processed information from 
cybersecurity activities and facilitate discussion between cybersecurity professionals and 
people with related backgrounds, thus, raising awareness of cybersecurity.
A. The cybersecurity triad
Security professionals consider three fundamental principles when assessing information 
protection. They are confidentiality, integrity and availability, the constituent components 
of what is known as the CIA triad:
• Confidentiality: establishes that the information can only be accessed by users and 
processes with the appropriate clearance level to do so.
• Integrity: refers to ensuring that information remains unaltered by unauthorized 
processes or access, from its origin to its use, and throughout the data’s life cycle.
• Availability: refers to the objective of ensuring that the information, the systems to 
process and access it, the distribution networks and the necessary equipment on the 
part of the end user, are within reach and functioning correctly in a timely manner.
In cybersecurity risk analyses, these three principles are assessed individually to determine 
the level of exposure to each one. Then, for each, different countermeasures are used to 
achieve a permissible level of residual risk. The information security triad can be weakened 
(or defeated) by different types of attacks described below.
B. Description of malware and its main variants
Malware: A contraction of the expression malicious software, this term refers to any type 
of computer language code that, when executed, performs harmful actions on a system 
intentionally and without the knowledge of the system’s user or owner. Before the term 
was coined in 1990 by Yisrael Radai, this concept was commonly referred to as a computer 
virus. These days, a computer virus, as will be explained later, is a particular type of malware 
and, in general, its most common motivations are:
• To experiment while learning.
• To be a nuisance and satisfy the creator’s ego.
• To damage to a computer system. The damage may be to the hardware (e.g. Stuxnet),1 
1 Stuxnet is malware that affects computers running with Microsoft Windows. It was the first one discovered for attacking 
industrial equipment, reprogramming PLCs and hiding those changes to avoid being detected. Stuxnet was detected in attacks 
on critical infrastructure such as nuclear power plants.
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the software or data, or cause the unavailability of an entire 
system (e.g. Code Red).2
• Degrade the operation of the system.
• Obtain an economic benefit by means of:
− Theft of confidential information (personal, business, 
defence, etc.) to be used in subsequent fraud or to be 
resold to third parties. Such malware is known as spyware.
− A ransom demanded from the system owner, as in the 
case of ransomware (explained in detail below).
− The appearance of unsolicited advertising, known as adware.
− The system’s involuntary participation in hidden networks, 
for criminal purposes, known as botnets.3
In technical terms, the structure of the malware may contain 
more than one component. The key portion is the payload, 
which is the malicious code itself, so it is always present. It may 
contain three additional portions intended to automatically 
distribute the infection, hide the true functionality of the malware (e.g., by making the 
user believe that it is a screen saver) and, finally, conceal the malicious activity (e.g. by 
deleting activity logs).
Malware can go by specific names, depending on the function for which it was created or 
the malicious activity it carries out, some of which are:
• Virus: the most common type of malware. It is an executable file, which when activated 
produces the damage for which it was created. Its properties enable it to spread within 
the computer system where it is hosted.
• Worm: capable of executing itself. It can spread through a data network and find 
vulnerabilities in other systems and install itself on them. 
• Trojan: It owes its name to the Trojan Horse and, as in that case, is a program that seems 
harmless and/or useful but has a hidden malicious functionality. That functionality 
usually allows the affected system to be controlled remotely or enables backdoors4 which 
allow unauthorized connections that try to go unnoticed. They usually do not reproduce.
• Logic bomb: activated when particular conditions are met; usually after a specific 
number of iterations or, more commonly, at a specific date and time.
• Adware: displays unsolicited advertising. When adware is intended to raise advertising 
money to finance free applications, it is called shareware.
• Spyware: its function is to capture private information from the affected computer and 
send it without the user’s consent. This information may be about industrial processes, 
personal data, credit card information, email addresses (which are then used to send 
unsolicited email), or pages visited. Sometimes spyware is installed as a trojan, i.e. it is 
hidden inside another program.
• Keylogger: allows all the keys pressed by the user to be saved in a file, no matter in 
which application. As a result, the file contains sensitive information such as passwords, 
private chats, confidential content, etc.
• Rogueware: emulates a product designed for security protection, such as an antivirus 
or anti-malware, and urges the user to run it in response to a supposed infection of the 
computer being used.5 It is usually activated on a website, and when you want attempt 
to uninstall it, it demands a payment for its supposed use.
2 CodeRed was a malware discovered in July 2001. On July 19 of that year, it affected 359,000 web servers.
3 Botnets are networks formed by computers that have fallen victim to software capable of combining the processing and 
memory resources of a computer systems to work together to process, in a distributed and anonymous way, chains related, 
usually, to computer crimes such as mass spamming, distribution of child pornography information and attacks on systems 
that become unresponsive following the receipt of a large number of simultaneous requests.
4 A backdoor is a programming sequence that enables access to a system without being noticed by the user and avoids access 
authentication algorithms.
5 This technique of intimidating the user to install an application that promises protection is known as scareware.
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• Decoy: imitates the access control interface of an application in order to steal user and 
password information.
• Dialler: Almost extinct due to newer modes of internet access via WiFi or ADSL; diallers 
were very popular when the Internet was accessed using telephone modems. They are 
intended to dial an unsolicited premium rate number and leave the line open, with the 
result that the cost is charged to the infected user.
• Wiper: a type of malware whose function is to delete information from the computer 
where it has been installed.
• Ransomware: a type of malware whose name comes from the combination of the words 
ransom and software and which, when executed, takes the affected system hostage by 
means of an encryption process and then demands payment of a ransom to restore the 
operability of that system. Needless to say, paying a ransom for the key to do that does 
not guarantee its reception, and payment should never be relied upon as a solution to 
a problem of this nature. 
C. Social engineering attacks
Social engineering refers to efforts by governments,6 media outlets or private groups, 
to influence certain social attitudes and behaviours on a large scale in order to achieve 
certain results in the population reached. In the context of cybersecurity, the concept refers 
to those actions that are designed to manipulate people into doing certain things on a 
computer system or disclosing confidential information for fraudulent purposes. Social 
engineering attacks commonly occur through email or phone calls, as well as some other 
techniques. They are classified as follows:
• Vishing: making phone calls to attempt to obtain valuable information covertly through 
purported surveys or trusted persons or institutions, so that the victim does not suspect 
that they are being deceived.
• Baiting: appealing to people’s curiosity and the human principle that everyone wants 
to help, a device with information (thumb drive, DVD, etc.) infected with malware, is 
deliberately left in an easy to find place. When the victim uses this found device to verify 
its origin or content, the malware is installed in one of the different forms described for 
the various types of malware.
6 To understand the results of social engineering, we can refer to studies conducted by Professor Robert Cialdini, as mentioned 
in his book “Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion”, where he concludes that the influence used in social engineering is based 
on the six fundamental principles of reciprocity, commitment and consistency, social proof, authority, liking and scarcity.
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• Pretexting: the creation of a fictitious scenario that encourages the victim to acts 
unusually or differently than he would under normal circumstances, thus revealing 
valuable information or leading to actions by the attacker. For example, through 
this technique, a social engineer could set himself up in a job by pretending to be a 
replacement for a person or by impersonating a legitimate person.
• Social networks: Although social networks came about for the purpose of interaction 
within circles of trust, careless use or incorrect privacy settings have become the most 
dangerous avenues of attack. People who do not pay attention to security or privacy 
settings on social networks can expose sensitive personal data and relationships, which 
can be used to perpetrate a targeted attack.
• Phishing: a very simple type of attack carried out by email that, despite its age, is so 
effective that it remains one of the most commonly used attack vectors in social 
engineering. It consists of sending an email that invites impulsive action as a result of 
the sense of urgency or opportunity that the sender manages to evoke. In the email, you 
are urged to access a link to a purportedly legal website using a username and password. 
In this way, the victim inputs their actual access credentials, which are then known to 
the attacker, who can use them at the genuine website. Generally, the pages that the 
attacker tries to emulate correspond to electronic payment sites, financial institutions 
or e-commerce sites due to their great potential for immediate monetization. However, 
they are not the only cases. Identity or tax information may also be targeted in phishing 
attacks. The effectiveness of this method is so high that in recent times it has become 
one of the three main attack vectors for ransomware to infiltrate systems. Anyone 
who unwittingly executes the installation of the malware, in the belief that they are 
accessing something in their interest or that they need, becomes a victim once the 
ransomware encrypts their system.
• Quid pro quo: which means "something in exchange for something", is the method used 
in telephone calls to employees of an institution, where the caller passes themselves of 
as a member of technical support, informs the user of the existence of an actual problem 
and then offers to help solve it. Once the user allows this help, the attacker installs the 
malware on the target system or performs the actual actions that prompted their call.
As tables 1 and 2 show, it is organizations with fewer employees that have a higher rate of 
receipt of fraudulent emails, as opposed to the existing cultural trend that attacks mainly 
affect large companies.
Table 1 
Annual rate of malicious emails by organization size




1 001–1 500 823
1 501–2 500 440
2 501+ 556
Source: Symantec, ISTR - Internet Security Threat Report, vol. 24, Mountain View, February, 2019 [online] https://docs.
broadcom.com/doc/istr-24-2019-en.
Table 2 
Number of malicious emails by organization size




1 001–1 500 7
1 501–2 500 4
2 501+ 11
Source: Symantec, ISTR - Internet Security Threat Report, vol. 24, Mountain View, February, 2019 [online] https://docs.
broadcom.com/doc/istr-24-2019-en.
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D. Different types of attack
The preceding sections cover the main methods for exploiting weaknesses arising from 
technology use. Based on these modalities, as well as some more specific ones that are 
inherent to certain technologies and therefore exceed the scope of this document, the 
industry led by cybercriminals has developed a range of techniques for different attack 
methods over the years; indeed, in recent times that development has been spurred 
by technology itself and the advances it has made. The use of artificial intelligence, for 
example, has refined the main methods of attack that can be carried out in a targeted, 
massive or mixed manner.
While there have been many recent victims of mass-distributed ransomware attacks that 
use phishing techniques, the cybercrime industry has improved its results by using a mixed 
approach that consists of a first step that involves mass discovery techniques to detect 
potential vulnerabilities, which are then exploited in a targeted manner using traditional 
procedures and tools. There has also been a considerable increase in the personalization 
of content used in social engineering techniques with the aim of exploiting information 
disclosed in data leaks. In 2019, leaked user information and passwords from breached sites 
began to be used in the content of extortive emails. In such emails, the attacker claims to 
possess illicit content from the recipient and to know the username and password sent 
to the email. Since in many cases people use the same password for multiple sites, the 
password sent may be familiar to the victim, and therefore he or she may be puzzled by 
the possible existence of such content. Of course, the attacker only has the username and 
password and is building a false story based on this weakness of using identical passwords 
for many sites. The figure revealed by IBM is alarming: 8.5 billion personal data records 
stolen in 2019, which are then traded or exchanged in cybercrime networks to be instantly 
monetized or used as information to develop social engineering attacks. This data is 
offered and traded on the same network and with the same connections as our normal 
Internet exchanges. The only difference is that they lie beneath different forms of access 
and are hidden from regular users and common methods of use and discovery. Although 
they share the medium, they do not have the same end, giving rise to different levels of 
complexity in accessing their contents.
E. The deep web, dark web and Mariana’s web
In discussing the concept of content that is not visible, it is necessary first to refer to 
Internet content as a whole. The overall Internet is usually represented as an iceberg, with 
the visible part associated with the portion of content that is visible on the traditional 
Internet, which is the web as most Internet users know it. For that reason, it is also called 
the surface web. The surface web is made up of content that search engines such as Google, 
Yahoo, Bing, and others index and offer to users via searches, much as a telephone directory 
would. Staying with the iceberg analogy, however, much of the content on the Internet is 
not indexed so that it can be offered to users because it contains technical information 
that requires the surface web to be used. That segment includes the databases where 
searches are performed, the emails stored by the providers of this service, etc. All Internet 
content that is not indexed, and therefore not visible, is called the deep web. Hence, the 
deep web is often called the invisible web or the hidden web.
Within this hidden portion, which represents approximately 90% of the content and which 
is not transparently accessible for Internet users, there is a small portion that can only 
be accessed by specific applications, i.e. a portion of approximately 0.1% of the content, 
which is intentionally hidden from normal web users. This portion, which was initially 
only a few pages called darknets, is now called the dark web. One of those pages is 
The Onion Router or TOR for short and is specifically used to access the content of the 
dark web. The aim of this project is to create a distributed communications network 
superimposed on the conventional web and to provide a gateway to the rest of the 
pages that make up the dark web that have been intentionally hidden owing to their 
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illicit content. Those pages are usually where cybercriminals offer their services and 
products; records obtained in data leaks, such as credit card information, passport 
numbers, email addresses with their respective passwords; attack services targeting 
institutions and companies; and pages used for drug trafficking, human trafficking, 
and arms sales, among other illegal content.
There is an even deeper and more hidden level in the deep web that, by analogy with 
the deep-ocean trench by the same name, is called the Mariana’s web, and access is 
limited to a very small segment of skilled programmers through the use of complex 
algorithms. The illegal content that can be found in these cases is so sensitive as to be 
extremely dangerous.
II. Recent incidents and statistical data on 
cybersecurity in the logistics industry
Knowledge of different incidents that have occurred, the problems, and their frequency 
or probability of occurrence allow us to determine the probability of its use in later risk 
assessments related to the security triad, which each process currently faces. From 2011 
to 2013, the Port of Antwerp in Belgium fell victim to an attack commissioned by a drug 
cartel against the terminal’s computer systems in order to release containers without 
the port authorities noticing. When the attack was discovered, electronic security 
devices were incorporated to protect the port’s network perimeter, but these were 
again breached and actions under the attack continued. In that incident, illicit drugs 
and contraband worth approximately US$ 365 million were seized, as were firearms.
In June 2017, the shipping company MAERSK sustained a ransomware attack that caused 
an operational disruption that resulted in losses of US$ 264 million. The investigation 
into this incident showed that the infection was due to the installation of uncontrolled 
software on the laptop of a commercial employee in Ukraine. In July 2018, the port of 
San Diego in the United States was also the target of a ransomware attack that used a 
piece of software that caused administrative and port permission disruptions. Later that 
year, COSCO was attacked with operational disruptions at its United States headquarters 
in Long Beach. In September 2018 the port of Barcelona in Spain was the victim of 
ransomware attacks that cause administrative disruptions; no information about the 
financial harm caused by the attacks has been disclosed. In February 2019, GPS jamming 
attacks were reported on the United States Navy Coast Guard in New York Harbour, and 
in July off the port of Shanghai. Recently there were reports of a case that affected the 
shipping company MSC, in which a piece of malware disrupted the disintermediation 
systems known as MyMSC, affecting access to services by end-users.
As figure 1 shows, the financial losses resulting from cybersecurity attacks are rising as 
the digitalization of processes advances, as shown in figure 1. It is important to keep in 
mind that these figures only cover reported events, despite the fact that it is well known 
that many incidents that occur are not reported but dealt with privately in order to avoid 
harm to the company’s reputation.
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Figure 1 
World: Annual economic losses due to cybercrime
(Millions of dollars)
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Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 2019 Internet Crime Annual Report, US Department of Justice, 2020 [online] 
https://pdf.ic3.gov/2019_IC3Report.pdf.
It is often thought that cybersecurity attacks occur less in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
given the scale of the organizations and because there is less use of new technologies 
compared to other parts of the world. However, a recent CheckPoint study in July 2020 
shows that the region is just as likely to be attacked as others, and even that some countries, 
such as the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru 
and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, have an above-average likelihood. Similarly, the real-
time threat map from the firm Kaspersky’s Lab shows that the region’s countries are in the 
top 25% of most attacked countries in the world, with Brazil being the third most attacked 
country worldwide.
These statistics include companies and institutions involved in logistics and transport, a 
sector that in 2019 showed a year-on-year growth rate of 78% in attacks that on different 
parts of supply chains, with the result that it ranked third with 10% of total attacks 
worldwide. This ranking for logistics and transport, which has also remained among the 
top ranked over the years, highlights the growing value of data from this sector for the 
cybercrime industry. That ranking, behind financial markets and retail, is explained by the 
value of electronic assets and the possibility of manipulating data in distribution chains, 
not to mention the domino effect on other sectors and services, which enhances and 
multiplies the damage caused by incidents.
The logistics and transportation sector is also highly attractive for access to high-value 
assets for inter-state espionage, such as biographical information, passport numbers, 
frequent flyer programs, credit card data, travel itineraries, and shipping manifests, among 
other elements that are usually handled in the industry.
With regard to the type of techniques used to attack facilities, the three main initial attack 
vectors are phishing (31% of cases), vulnerability scanning and exploitation (30%), and 
theft of access credentials (29%). It is striking that most of the attacks that exploit existing 
vulnerabilities in hardware or software systems are common vulnerabilities and exposures 
(CVE) that have existed for up to two years;7 in other words, vulnerabilities that are public 
knowledge. More than 80% of the attacks carried out in the first half of 2020 could have 
been prevented by applying update patches that have been available since 2017 or earlier, 
many of which are free. This shows not only how difficult it is to keep up with security 
7 CVEs are contained in a list of recorded information about known security vulnerabilities, where each entry has a CVE-ID 
number, a description of the vulnerability, the software versions affected, possible fixes for the fault (if any) or how to configure 
to mitigate the vulnerability, and references to posts or forum or blog entries where the vulnerability has been made public.
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updates provided by software manufacturers, despite the large-scale campaigns they 
carry out and awareness efforts with technical staff in technology departments on this 
problem, but also how hard it is, in some cases, to replace obsolete versions of software, 
due to compatibility of products or applications with basic operating systems in end-user 
computers and central processing servers.
There is also a tendency to misinterpret that it is more problematic, or that there are not 
as many tools developed by third parties to exploit hardware vulnerabilities. This makes 
it very complex to replace certain hardware products, such as PLCs or HMIs, which have 
been delivered on a turnkey basis to industrial facilities, and whose replacement requires 
re-engineering and investment. For this reason, in addition to the need to have more and 
more real-time data resulting from the connection of traditional factory floor or industrial 
networks, cybercriminals have included in their tool kits the possibility of reaching these 
types of networks and infrastructure with the aim of causing operational disruptions.
It is important to mention the high incidence of critical infrastructure managed by 
governments and public and private institutions in the logistics chain and in people’s daily 
lives. These organizations need to take note of cyberattacks that can seriously affect the 
economy as a result of dependent activities. The X-Force report shows a year-on-year increase 
in rate of attacks on operational technology (OT) networks of 2,000% between October 2018 
and October 2019. In fact, activity in 2019 was higher than for the whole of the previous 
three years. Most of these attacks are on known vulnerabilities in SCADA systems,8 as well 
as brute force attacks with factory passwords on industrial control systems (ICS). This fact is 
supported by a Symantec study which found that almost 60% of passwords used in attacks 
on OT networks are trivial and more than 90% of them were carried out with an insecure 
network protocol and plain text data transmission using a telnet service. For example, the 
passwords “123456” and “(empty)” were successfully used in 24.6% and 17% of (annual) IoT 
attacks respectively, with the telnet protocol as the avenue for 90.9% of the attacks.
It was in this existing complex cybersecurity scenario that COVID-19 appeared at the 
beginning of 2020, becoming a catalyst of digital transformation, as well as accelerating 
human beings’ adaptability to new forms of work. With its arrival, as well as the urgency 
of information and news distribution, COVID-19-related phishing and ransomware attacks 
increased exponentially, as figure 2 shows.
Figure 2 
World: Cyberattacks since the appearance of COVID-19
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Source: CheckPoint, “Cyber attack trends: 2020 mid-year report”, Check Point Software Technologies Ltd., Tel Aviv, July 2020 
[online] https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/cyber-attack-trends-2020-mid-year-report/.
8 Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) is a concept used in making computer software for remote control and 
monitoring of industrial processes.
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From June 2019 to June 2020, ransomware attacks increased year-on-year by 108%, while 
attacks on IoT networks went up 833%. This growth reflects the exploitation of exposed 
vulnerabilities due to the speed with which technology departments had to cover an 
unexpected demand to make information available by new methods, for more people and 
in very short time, and in that way, manage to keep operational processes running.
Finally, a fact regarding ransomware attacks that highlights a new concern and opens up 
a different approach is the case of a major global money management firm for travellers 
that suffered a ransomware attack in January 2020. It decided to apply its own recovery 
procedures, refusing to pay the ransom for the hijacked information, and was threatened 
by the group that created Sodinokibi with the disclosure of 5 Gb of customer information 
stolen prior to encryption, thus exposing them to a possible breach of the European Union’s 
international personal data protection laws (GDPR).9
III. Main cybersecurity challenges for transport and 
logistics in Latin America and the Caribbean
In relation to how the quantity and form of attacks have evolved, based on its interpretation 
of the statistics presented, ECLAC identifies the main challenges for the near future in 
the area of cybersecurity as being in activities related to transport and logistics. Among 
those involved in the operations of companies and institutions that make up the logistics 
ecosystem there is a cultural tendency to underestimate cybersecurity problems, despite 
their increase in recent years. This is deduced from problems having to do with the usual 
behaviour of individuals. Phishing and weak passwords are the initial causes of two thirds 
of attacks, the other third being the result of a lack of mindfulness of the need to keep 
systems up to date. Therefore, the human factor continues to be a deciding one in today’s 
challenges, particularly in human capital outside technology areas. Understanding this 
issue is key, as developing strategies in relation to this challenge would not only benefit 
labour activities, but also the security paradigm shift in the whole society as we currently 
know it, adding its new indispensable dimension of cybersecurity.
There is a noticeable sense, based on the time it takes to react to updates and the lack of 
internal policies to renew equipment that is being left unsupported by the manufacturer, 
that security is still seen as a separate (or secondary, if not non-existent) technological 
innovation process that represents higher internal costs and greater operational efforts 
when it comes to preventing or correcting technological risks related to one or more of the 
components of the security triad.
In 2020 there will be four times more devices connected to the Internet than there are 
people on the planet; 31,000 million devices will be delivering data in real time to be used 
in the ecosystems of big data and artificial intelligence. Adding this information to that 
from other technologies, from 2020 to 2025, four times more information will be generated 
than in the whole of human history. This growth in the area of potential attacks will lead to 
increased criminal attacks on data and devices in the logistics ecosystem.
Despite that outlook, the opportunity for Latin American and Caribbean states to benefit 
their logistics services by implementing new technologies participating in logistics 4.0 
cannot be affected, much less discouraged, by the challenges of cybersecurity. It should 
be remembered that the worst technological risk lies not in cybersecurity, but in lack of 
innovation and failure to exploit opportunities for efficiency improvements in logistics 
chains through the use of new technologies. The current state of cybersecurity is the result 
of years of systematic neglect of this problem; however, if cybersecurity is addressed as 
an integral part of innovation, it not only minimizes exposure to risk, but also accelerates 
processes of change and maximizes the end-to-end efficiency and reliability of the chain. 
9 The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (Regulation 2016/679) is a set of rules by which the European Parliament, the 
Council of the European Union and the European Commission seek to strengthen and unify data protection for all individuals 
within the EU.
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Therefore, it is necessary immediately to initiate action plans to minimize technological 
risks, since otherwise they will become a major enemy of the development of logistics 4.0 
and, consequently, of the economy derived from this important activity in the countries 
that make up the Latin American and Caribbean community.
IV. Action plan to secure the path to logistics 4.0
In a global economy with historical recession figures resulting from the pandemic triggered 
by COVID-19, the cybercrime industry remains as lucrative as ever and is increasingly active. 
It is imperative, therefore, to develop a strategic plan aligning measures consistent with 
the extent of the problem.
As this is an issue that goes beyond the traditional dimensions of physical security and 
transcends international borders, there is a need to strengthen cooperation between nations 
and public and private cybercrime investigation agencies in order to establish organizations 
and policies that can address the problem of cybersecurity in a globally coordinated manner.
In that regard, important efforts have been made to improve logistics security, such as 
the security recommendations made by the International Maritime Organization (IMO),10 
based mainly on international standard ISO/IEC 27001, which is generally applicable to 
information and communication technologies. 
Lack of regulation of such matters in countries can affect the effectiveness of these 
measures. It is advisable therefore for governments to analyse the benefits that would 
accrue to their economies if the activity were governed by compliance rules similar to those 
in place in the financial sector. Administrative action in that regard would strengthen the 
confidence of international markets in the sustainability of the activity. Without it, the 
efforts and recommendations set out below would depend on the appetite and duty of 
individual members, who would assuredly do so for their own benefit but would continue 
to depend on the same duty and appetite of their counterparts, for the sustainability of 
their own process and the benefit of regional economies.
A. Lines of action of the strategic plan
Following the recommendations contained in international standard ISO/IEC 27001, it is 
advisable for actions overall to target three main lines of action: Processes, Technology 
and People. To that end, concrete actions have been selected from it that will allow the 
fundamental steps in these guidelines to be taken.
1. Process-based actions
The initial approach to processes should be framed within a general policy that clearly 
expresses the commitment to cybersecurity of the highest entity in the organization, 
clearly stating the general reasons why the institution considers it important to address the 
problem in a comprehensive manner with due adherence by all members of the institution.
• The general policy is the founding document of an “information security management 
system”, which should contain the policy and procedure documents necessary for 
specific security actions.
• With an eye to disruptive technologies, it is essential to consider the appropriate 
cybersecurity activities from the outset of each digital transformation project, given 
that each stage has cybersecurity activities inherent in the definitions and deliverables 
of that stage. The longer it takes to think about cybersecurity, the more complex it 
becomes to manage risk. 
• Develop a contingency plan to keep the institution’s essential processes active in the 
event of possible incidents that could undermine the availability of technology. The 
10 See MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3, Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management.
13 F A L
plan should be a living, breathing document, constantly under improvement. Regular 
exercises and improvements not only strengthen confidence in reacting to real incidents, 
but become real, ongoing training. Likewise, the contingency plan should provide a list 
of improvements to be made and checked at its next test, thus generating a circular 
process of continuous improvement.
• Subject systems to regular third-party stress tests – Cybersecurity systems should be 
permanently stressed with ethical hacking or penetration tests to detect uncontrolled 
changes and newly discovered exposures and correct deviations, before being 
repeated. The importance of this process lies in the objectivity with which a specialized 
professional team can spot deviations from standards or vulnerabilities, which may 
be caused —whether intentionally or unintentionally— by the inadequate operation, 
integration, maintenance and design of systems.
• Evaluate taking out an insurance policy that allows for the transfer of cybersecurity risks.
2. Technology-based actions
• The traditional basic information system security tasks should not be up for discussion 
and all should be implemented. Backing up and verifying your recovery utility, using 
firewalls to establish logical perimeter protections, and using up-to-date anti-virus 
software are still absolutely necessary. Between the backup and the lost data in an 
incident, there is a time known as the recovery point objective (RPO), which should be 
assumed as the worst restoration status. Today’s dynamic processes cannot resort to 
this alternative frequently, but it is still the best way to control the worst-case scenario 
as far as data recovery situations are concerned, such as in the event of a ransomware 
attack, for example.
• Many of the attacks that take place, occur with appropriate equipment installed 
that has been incorrectly implemented without expert review. When choosing 
technology for protection against specific risks, the total cost of the appropriateness 
of the solution must be considered. This includes the purchase cost, the cost 
and local availability of appropriate technical support for configuration and 
maintenance, and when the product reaches the end of its life cycle, which 
determines its maximum amortization. It should be emphasized that correctly 
implemented intermediate technology is much more effective than the latest 
technology implemented without oversight.
• Keep software and hardware permanently up-to-date, ensuring that they are within the 
limits of their useful life and have manufacturer support. In 2019, 150,000 vulnerabilities 
were revealed. Patching vulnerabilities remains a problem for many organizations and 
cybercriminals know it. And it will be more so if there is no manufacturer support. It 
is a good strategy to have controls based on competing interests between areas that 
deal with patching and status control of these updates. This oversight can be done with 
simple interpretation reports, allowing organizations with pared-back structures to 
assign it to the internal control or administrative areas, for example.
• Have in place advanced event analysis tools with online alerts 7x24x365. Ideally, have 
an identification and communication process to ensure that a cybersecurity incident 
is addressed immediately to minimize the impact. Those in charge of cybersecurity in 
institutions that have been victims of effective attacks underscore the importance of 
quickly detecting and isolating the attack and the affected systems. This process can be 
dealt with by using technology contained in software provided as part of a service or be 
implemented by humans. The latter scenario is known as a security operations centre 
(SOC), for which there is currently a very marked trend, due to the speed with which an 
incident is addressed when this process is implemented.
• Intrinsically safe technologies. Most business technologies emerged and evolved 
without consideration to the hyperconnected world. Cobol systems, SAPs, plant 
floor systems, etc., were designed for controlled network environments and low 
interoperability with unknown networks. A lot of effort is being put into adding to them 
the necessary security layer so that they can be used in today’s environments. In new 
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innovation developments, serious consideration should be given to using intrinsically 
safe technologies, such as blockchain. 
• Consider using two-factor authentication methods that prevent unauthorized access 
as a result of weak passwords.
• Apply a layered defence model in operational technology networks to prevent an 
attack on the administrative or management network from spreading and halting 
productive processes.
3. People-focused actions
• Human capital in general. Train all staff on a constant basis. Such training should 
be done with adequate induction training when person joins the work team and be 
reinforced approximately every 2 years. At a minimum this should include policies on 
data privacy, data backup, use of passwords and responsible Internet use. This training 
should also be reinforced monthly with short training courses that create permanent 
awareness about passwords, phishing, etc. It is also highly advisable to engage in ethical 
and controlled phishing, in order to measure how effective the awareness is.
• Have a copy of a non-disclosure agreement signed by each collaborator that clearly 
explains the objectives of the agreement and the penalties for non-compliance.
• Technology personnel should have recurring spaces assigned to cybersecurity developments 
to raise awareness.
V. The road from cybersecurity to cyberimmunity
For many years, the concept of fear, uncertainty, and doubt (FUD) has been discussed 
in the cybersecurity arena, which has helped to implement information security 
technologies. The detail that must be grasped in relation to the success of this concept 
is that, in a world where information technology created isolated systems or systems 
connected with other systems via specific points, defence systems such as antivirus 
software, firewalls, etc. were the solution to the main problems of electronic security 
and theft of confidential information. In recent years, with the advent of technologies 
that form the work environment known as Industry 4.0, in a hyperconnected world 
where systems have come to form ecosystems, to continue using the FUD principle 
would be a mistake that could deepen the crisis. This is because such an approach 
could increase the technological inequality between those who implement these 
changes and those who do not, leaving out of the fourth industrial revolution those 
institutions that out of fear do not implement technological solutions as a driver of 
operational efficiency. The biggest risk in a hyper-digitized and hyperconnected world 
is failure to take technological risks.
Recognizing that risk can never be zero and knowing that in a hyperconnected world 
security breaches can occur in fractions of a second,11 at a great distances, and without 
the need to carry tools or weapons, sustaining an attack that violates our security is only a 
matter of time. Therefore, it is advisable to begin developing strategic plans so that, in the 
same way as the organisms of living fend off attacks, computer ecosystems are equipped 
with a cyberimmunity system.12 As with living organisms, such a system takes into account 
that the immune systems of organizations are never perfect and can be damaged by 
viruses or other malignant objects that can attack functions in the organization or 
even the immune system itself. However, systems adapt and learn, and in that cycle of 
continuous learning they become more effective, incorporating new and better defences 
to stop new and unknown attacks. They may even be able to stop them without knowing 
precisely the objective of the attack or the means for carrying it out. Thinking about 
cyberimmunity makes it possible, in the event of being defeated by a threat, quickly to 
11 The definition of risk is the direct function of the potential harm of a threat or hazard and the probability of its occurrence.
12 The concept was first developed by Professor Peter Wlodarczak of the University of Southern Queensland in his technical note 
entitled “Cyber Immunity - A Bio-Inspired Cyber Defense System” (Wlodarczak, 2017).
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restore the institution’s essential operational functions, thus allowing the loss triangle in 
the resilience curve to be reduced and normal functions to be recovered and exceeding the 
results prior to the incident.
VI. Conclusions
In an increasingly digital and connected world, with disruptive technologies and 
demanding implementation times, exposure to a cyberattack is only a matter of time. The 
effort must then be made to lower the chances of occurrence by means of a cybersecurity 
management plan that includes effective measures in relation to processes, technology 
and people, regardless of the size of the organization, while at the same time preparing as 
well as possible to deal with an incident.
It is advisable to understand the process of cybersecurity as an immune system similar to 
that of a biological being, comprising a number of elements with very different functions 
that prevent an infection or disease. Just as in living organisms, an organization’s immune 
system is never perfect and viruses and other pathogenic microbes will find ways to deceive 
or even attack it. However, immune systems have one very important feature in common: 
they learn and adapt. They can be “educated” through vaccination against potential threats. 
In times of danger, they can be assisted with prepared antibodies. Through some techniques 
such as immediate attention to atypical events detected through permanent monitoring 
of technological activity, organizations can defend themselves from cyberattacks, even 
without having a very clear understanding of what is happening.
With this new approach called cyberimmunity, the logistics community in Latin America 
and the Caribbean can protect themselves individually, maintaining operational continuity 
and data protection in the logistics 4.0 environment. However, given the functional 
interdependence of the logistics chain, the unavailability of one of its components affects 
the entire ecosystem. Therefore, the development of regulatory bodies and mechanisms 
to formalize and strengthen trust among the components of the end-to-end system 
and improve the competitiveness and confidence of global markets cannot be neglected 
or delayed.
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This FAL Bulletin continues the Reflections on Disruptive Technologies 
in Transport that ECLAC has been publishing through this medium. The 
present edition analyses the importance of the digital transformation of 
logistics, especially in the current circumstances where the need for fluid, 
safe and resilient logistics calls for additional actions on traceability and 
process facilitation.
The document was prepared by Luis Valdés Figueroa, ECLAC Consultant and 
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